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Synthese, Volume 173
Volume 173, Number 1, March 2010
- Joe Salerno:
Introduction to knowability and beyond. 1-8 - Neil Tennant:
Williamson's Woes. 9-23 - Michael Hand:
Antirealism and universal knowability. 25-39 - Dorothy Edgington:
Possible knowledge of unknown truth. 41-52 - Michael Fara:
Knowability and the capacity to know. 53-73 - Carlo Proietti, Gabriel Sandu:
Fitch's paradox and ceteris paribus modalities. 75-87 - Jonathan Kvanvig:
The incarnation and the knowability paradox. 89-105 - Richard Routley:
Necessary limits to knowledge: unknowable truths. 107-122
Volume 173, Number 2, March 2010
- Fenrong Liu, Olivier Roy:
Advances in belief dynamics: Introduction. 123-126 - John Cantwell:
On an alleged counter-example to causal decision theory. 127-152 - Sven Ove Hansson:
Multiple and iterated contraction reduced to single-step single-sentence contraction. 153-177 - Natasha Alechina, Brian Logan:
Belief ascription under bounded resources. 179-197 - Daniele Porello:
Ranking judgments in Arrow's setting. 199-210
Volume 173, Number 3, April 2010
- Timothy Chan:
Moore's Paradox is not just another pragmatic paradox. 211-229 - Conor McHugh:
Self-knowledge and the KK principle. 231-257 - Francesca Poggiolesi:
Display calculi and other modal calculi: a comparison. 259-279 - Arvid Båve:
Deflationism and the primary truth bearer. 281-297 - Stephen Clarke:
Transcendental realisms in the philosophy of science: on Bhaskar and Cartwright. 299-315 - Martin Montminy:
Two contextualist fallacies. 317-333 - Joe Morrison:
Just how controversial is evidential holism? 335-352 - Sheldon R. Smith:
Elementary classical mechanics and the principle of the Composition of Causes. 353-373
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