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Synthese, Volume 158
Volume 158, Number 1, September 2007
- Elaine Landry:
Shared structure need not be shared set-structure. 1-17 - Peter J. Graham:
The theoretical diagnosis of skepticism. 19-39 - Leon Horsten, Philip D. Welch:
The Undecidability of Propositional Adaptive Logic. 41-60 - K. Brad Wray:
Kuhnian Revolutions Revisited. 61-73 - Sjoerd D. Zwart, Maarten Franssen:
An impossibility theorem for verisimilitude. 75-92 - Matthias Adam:
Two Notions of Scientific Justification. 93-108 - Fred Keijzer, Maurice Schouten:
Embedded Cognition and Mental Causation: Setting Empirical Bounds on Metaphysics. 109-125 - Philippe Schlenker:
How to eliminate self-reference: a précis. 127-138 - Ken Levy:
Baumann on the Monty Hall problem and single-case probabilities. 139-151
Volume 158, Number 2, September 2007
- Jan Plaza:
Logics of public communications. 165-179 - Hans P. van Ditmarsch:
Comments to 'logics of public communications'. 181-187 - Katie Steele:
Distinguishing indeterminate belief from "risk-averse" preferences. 189-205 - Jesse Hughes, Peter Kroes, Sjoerd Zwart:
A Semantics for Means-end Relations. 207-231 - Marc Pauly:
Axiomatizing collective judgment sets in a minimal logical language. 233-250 - Andrés Perea:
A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies. 251-271
Volume 158, Number 3, October 2007
- Duncan Pritchard:
Introduction. 273-275 - Duncan Pritchard:
Anti-luck epistemology. 277-297 - John Greco:
Worries about Pritchard's safety. 299-302 - Avram Hiller, Ram Neta:
Safety and epistemic luck. 303-313 - Sanford C. Goldberg:
How lucky can you get? 315-327 - Wayne Riggs:
Why epistemologists are so down on their luck. 329-344 - Jennifer Lackey:
Why we don't deserve credit for everything we know. 345-361 - Guy Axtell:
Two for the show: Anti-luck and virtue epistemologies in consonance. 363-383 - E. J. Coffman:
Thinking about luck. 385-398
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