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Synthese, Volume 101
Volume 101, Number 1, October 1994
- Yvon Gauthier:
Hilbert and the internal logic of mathematics. 1-14 - William Boos:
The world, the flesh and the argument from design. 15-52 - Philip Hugly, Charles Sayward:
Quantifying over the reals. 53-64 - Gerhard Schurz, Karel Lambert:
Outline of a theory of scientific understanding. 65-120 - Jan Wolenski, Gabriel Sandu:
Review essay. 121-127
Volume 101, Number 2, November 1994
- David K. Henderson:
Accounting for macro-level causation. 129-156 - André Fuhrmann, Isaac Levi:
Undercutting and the Ramsey test for conditionals. 157-169 - L. Jonathan Cohen:
Some steps towards a general theory of relevance. 171-185 - Stephen Leeds:
Constructive empiricism. 187-221 - Craig Dilworth:
Principles, laws, theories and the metaphysics of science. 223-247 - Maarten Franssen:
Constrained maximization reconsidered - An elaboration and critique of Gauthier's modelling of rational cooperation in a single prisoner's dilemma. 249-272 - Steven D. Hales:
Self-deception and belief attribution. 273-289 - Ilkka Niiniluoto:
Truthlikeness misapplied: A reply to Ernest W. Adams. 291-300
Volume 101, Number 3, December 1994
- Andy Clark:
Introduction: Reinventing the connectionist challenge. 301-303 - Terence Horgan, John Tienson:
A nonclassical framework for cognitive science. 305-345 - Robert J. Matthews:
Three-concept monte: Explanation, implementation and systematicity. 347-363 - Brian P. McLaughlin, Ted A. Warfield:
The allure of connectionism reexamined. 365-400 - Andy Clark, Josefa Toribio:
Doing without representing? 401-431 - William Bechtel:
Natural deduction in connectionist systems. 433-463 - Kenneth Aizawa:
Representations without rules, connectionism and the syntactic argument. 465-492
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