default search action
Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 33
Volume 33, Number 1, June 2009
- Ernesto Savaglio, Stefano Vannucci:
On the volume-ranking of opportunity sets in economic environments. 1-24 - Sayantan Ghosal, Ben Lockwood:
Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: is turnout too high or too low? 25-50 - Hans Gersbach:
Competition of politicians for wages and office. 51-71 - M. Remzi Sanver, Özer Selçuk:
Sophisticated preference aggregation. 73-86 - Elette Boyle, Federico Echenique:
Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets. 87-99 - James Konow:
Is fairness in the eye of the beholder? An impartial spectator analysis of justice. 101-127 - D. Jayaraj, S. Subramanian:
The wellbeing implications of a change in the sex-ratio of a population. 129-150 - Masashi Umezawa:
Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule. 151-158 - M. Remzi Sanver:
Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approach. 159-171 - Marc Fleurbaey:
Louis Kaplow: The theory of taxation and public economics - Princeton University Press, xx, 472 p., ISBN 978-0-691-13077-4. 173-176
Volume 33, Number 2, August 2009
- Michel Grabisch, Agnieszka Rusinowska:
Measuring influence in command games. 177-209 - Marcello D'Agostino, Valentino Dardanoni:
What's so special about Euclidean distance? - A characterization with applications to mobility and spatial voting. 211-233 - Rolf Aaberge:
Ranking intersecting Lorenz curves. 235-259 - Ascensión Andina-Díaz:
Media competition and information disclosure. 261-280 - Moshe Koppel, Abraham Diskin:
Measuring disproportionality, volatility and malapportionment: axiomatization and solutions. 281-286 - Michel Le Breton, Vera Zaporozhets:
On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties. 287-309 - Christopher R. H. Hanusa:
Ensuring every candidate wins under positional voting. 311-333 - Johan Fellman:
Discontinuous transformations, Lorenz curves and transfer policies. 335-342
Volume 33, Number 3, September 2009
- José L. Jimeno, Joaquín Pérez Ortega, Estefanía García:
An extension of the Moulin No Show Paradox for voting correspondences. 343-359 - Brennan C. Platt:
Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core. 361-381 - Ayse Mumcu, Ismail Saglam:
Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket. 383-403 - Kohei Kamaga, Takashi Kojima:
Q-anonymous social welfare relations on infinite utility streams. 405-413 - Lee R. Gibson, Robert C. Powers:
The NIP graph of a social welfare function. 415-421 - Kentaro Hatsumi, Shigehiro Serizawa:
Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods. 423-447 - Luc Lauwers:
The topological approach to the aggregation of preferences. 449-476 - Miguel Ángel Ballester Oyarzun, Pedro Rey-Biel:
Does uncertainty lead to sincerity? Simple and complex voting mechanisms. 477-494 - Dylan Shepardson, Craig A. Tovey:
Smallest tournaments not realizable by \frac23-majority voting. 495-503 - John William Hatfield:
Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations. 505-515 - Carmen Herrero, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Giovanni Ponti:
On the adjudication of conflicting claims: an experimental study. 517-519
Volume 33, Number 4, November 2009
- Pablo Amorós:
Unequivocal majority and Maskin-monotonicity. 521-532 - Kristof Bosmans, Erik Schokkaert:
Equality preference in the claims problem: a questionnaire study of cuts in earnings and pensions. 533-557 - Marcus Pivato:
Geometric models of consistent judgement aggregation. 559-574 - Hal W. Snarr, Jeffrey A. Edwards:
Does income support increase abortions? 575-599 - Alan Krause:
A general equilibrium analysis of the Laffer argument. 601-615 - Eliora van der Hout, Anthony J. McGann:
Liberal political equality implies proportional representation. 617-627 - Kai-yuen Tsui:
Measurement of income mobility: a re-examination. 629-645 - Takeshi Suzuki:
Natural implementation in public goods economies. 647-664 - Hans Gersbach, Hans Haller:
Bargaining power and equilibrium consumption. 665-690 - Nicolas Houy:
More on the stable, generalized stable, absorbing and admissible sets. 691-698
manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.