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Journal of Philosophical Logic, Volume 5
Volume 5, Number 1, February 1976
- Ermanno Bencivenga:
Set theory and free logic. 1-15 - Michael Devitt:
Suspension of judgment: A response to Heidelberger on Kaplan. 17-24 - Allen Hazen:
Expressive completeness in modal language. 25-46 - Kenton F. Machina:
Truth, belief, and vagueness. 47-78 - Bryan Norton:
Is counterpart theory inadequate? 79-89 - Carl J. Posy:
Varieties of indeterminacy in the theory of general choice sequences. 91-132 - Orin Safir:
Concrete forms - Their application to the logical paradoxes and Gödel's theorem. 133-154
Volume 5, Number 2, May 1976
- Alan Code:
Aristotle's response to Quine's objections to modal logic. 159-186 - Brian Ellis:
Epistemic foundations of logic. 187-204 - W. D. Hart, Colin McGinn:
Knowledge and necessity. 205-208 - Geoffrey Sampson:
An empirical hypothesis about natural semantics. 209-236 - Ernst-Walther Stachow:
Completeness of quantum logic. 237-280 - Thomas S. Weston:
Kreisel, the continuum hypothesis and second order set theory. 281-298
Volume 5, Number 3, August 1976
- John Bigelow:
Possible worlds foundations for probability. 299-320 - Ronald N. Giere:
A laplacean formal semantics for single-case propensities. 321-353 - Henry E. Kyburg Jr.:
Chance. 355-393 - Sherry May:
Probability kinematics: A constrained optimization problem. 395-398 - Stephen Spielman:
Exchangeability and the certainty of objective randomness. 399-406 - Stephen Spielman:
Carnap's robot and inductive logic. 407-415 - Bas C. van Fraassen:
Representational of conditional probabilities. 417-430 - Patrick Suppes, Mario Zanotti:
Necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of a unique measure strictly agreeing with a qualitative probability ordering. 431-438
Volume 5, Number 4, November 1976
- Michael Byrd:
Single variable formulas in S4→. 439-456 - Susan Haack:
Some preliminaries to ontology. 457-474 - Virginia Klenk:
Intended models and the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem. 475-489 - Gail C. Stine:
Intentional inexistence. 491-510 - Charles G. Morgan:
Tuomela on deductive explanation. 511-525 - Raimo Tuomela:
Morgan on deductive explanation: A rejoinder. 527-543
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