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Journal of Philosophical Logic, Volume 19
Volume 19, Number 1, February 1990
- Kevin T. Kelly, Clark Glymour:
Theory discovery from data with mixed quantifiers. 1-33 - Ross T. Brady:
The gentzenization and decidability of RW. 35-73 - Sven Ove Hansson:
Preference-based deontic logic (PDL). 75-93 - Mark A. Brown:
Action and ability. 95-114
Volume 19, Number 2, May 1990
- Johan van Benthem:
Categorial grammar and type theory. 115-168 - Lou Goble:
A logic of good, should, and would. 169-199 - Graham Priest:
Boolean negation and all that. 201-215 - Seiki Akama:
Subformula semantics for strong negation systems. 217-226
Volume 19, Number 3, August 1990
- Daniel Bonevac:
Paradoxes of fulfillment. 229-252 - Lou Goble:
A logic ofGood, Should, andWould. 253-276 - Keith Simmons:
The diagonal argument and the Liar. 277-303 - John M. Vickers:
Compactness in finite probabilistic inference. 305-316 - Charles B. Daniels:
The propositional objects of mental attitudes. 317-342
Volume 19, Number 4, November 1990
- Michael Detlefsen:
On an alleged refutation of Hilbert's Program using Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem. 343-377 - Ian F. Carlstrom:
A truth-functional logic for near-universal generalizations. 379-405 - William Seager:
The logic of lost lingens. 407-428 - Peter D. Turney:
Embeddability, syntax, and semantics in accounts of scientific theories. 429-451
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