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Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 180
Volume 180, March 2019
- Kym Pram:
On the equivalence of robustness to canonical and general elaborations. 1-10 - Wei He, Yeneng Sun:
Pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games. 11-49 - Daeyoung Jeong:
Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers. 50-80 - Sophie Bade:
Matching with single-peaked preferences. 81-99 - Gary Charness, Michael Näf, Alessandro Sontuoso:
Opportunistic conformism. 100-134 - Charles Zhoucheng Zheng:
Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: Implementability versus security. 135-166 - Jun Zhang:
Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable. 167-177 - Jimmy Chan, Seher Gupta, Fei Li, Yun Wang:
Pivotal persuasion. 178-202 - Kristoffer P. Nimark, Savitar Sundaresan:
Inattention and belief polarization. 203-228 - Saptarshi Mukherjee, Nozomu Muto, Eve Ramaekers, Arunava Sen:
Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: The Pareto correspondence and a generalization. 229-243 - Piotr Skowron, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii Slinko:
Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules. 244-273 - Francesco Giovannoni, Siyang Xiong:
Communication under language barriers. 274-303 - Jesper Rüdiger, Adrien Vigier:
Learning about analysts. 304-335 - Helmuts Azacis, Péter Vida:
Repeated implementation: A practical characterization. 336-367 - Tai-Wei Hu, Eran Shmaya:
Unique monetary equilibrium with inflation in a stationary Bewley-Aiyagari model. 368-382 - T. Tony Ke, J. Miguel Villas-Boas:
Optimal learning before choice. 383-437
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