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Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 136
Volume 136, Number 1, September 2007
- Lars Peter Hansen, Thomas J. Sargent:
Recursive robust estimation and control without commitment. 1-27 - Gary Charness, Margarida Corominas-Bosch, Guillaume Fréchette:
Bargaining and network structure: An experiment. 28-65 - Dimitri Vayanos, Tan Wang:
Search and endogenous concentration of liquidity in asset markets. 66-104 - Effrosyni Diamantoudi, Licun Xue:
Coalitions, agreements and efficiency. 105-125 - Costas Azariadis, Leo Kaas:
Asset price fluctuations without aggregate shocks. 126-143 - David McAdams:
Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation. 144-166 - Hüseyin Yildirim:
Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition. 167-196 - Uzi Segal, Joel Sobel:
Tit for tat: Foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings. 197-216 - Jose Apesteguia, Steffen Huck, Jörg Oechssler:
Imitation - theory and experimental evidence. 217-235 - Helmut Bester, Roland Strausz:
Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication. 236-259 - Roger B. Myerson:
Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information. 260-285 - David S. Ahn:
Hierarchies of ambiguous beliefs. 286-301 - Vianney Dequiedt:
Efficient collusion in optimal auctions. 302-323 - Simon Board:
Selling options. 324-340 - Ilya Segal:
The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets. 341-378 - Tai-Wei Hu:
On p-rationalizability and approximate common certainty of rationality. 379-391 - Fernando García-Belenguer:
Stability, global dynamics and Markov equilibrium in models of endogenous economic growth. 392-416 - Gary Charness, Matthew O. Jackson:
Group play in games and the role of consent in network formation. 417-445 - Martin F. Hellwig:
The role of boundary solutions in principal-agent problems of the Holmström-Milgrom type. 446-475 - Nolan Miller, John W. Pratt, Richard J. Zeckhauser, Scott Johnson:
Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations. 476-496 - Arnold Polanski:
A decentralized model of information pricing in networks. 497-512 - Yan Chen, Peter Katuscák, Emre Ozdenoren:
Sealed bid auctions with ambiguity: Theory and experiments. 513-535 - Norio Takeoka:
Subjective probability over a subjective decision tree. 536-571 - Andrés Perea:
Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games. 572-586 - Lars Ehlers, Jordi Massó:
Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets. 587-600 - Rui Zhao:
Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard. 601-640 - William H. Sandholm:
Evolution in Bayesian games II: Stability of purified equilibria. 641-667 - Kiyohiko G. Nishimura, Hiroyuki Ozaki:
Irreversible investment and Knightian uncertainty. 668-694
- Duozhe Li:
Bargaining with history-dependent preferences. 695-708 - Miquel Faig, Xiuhua Huangfu:
Competitive-search equilibrium in monetary economies. 709-718 - Paan Jindapon, William S. Neilson:
Higher-order generalizations of Arrow-Pratt and Ross risk aversion: A comparative statics approach. 719-728 - Tommy Sveen, Lutz Weinke:
Firm-specific capital, nominal rigidities, and the Taylor principle. 729-737 - Dmitriy Kvasov:
Contests with limited resources. 738-748 - Navin Kartik:
A note on cheap talk and burned money. 749-758 - Jacques Drèze, Michel Le Breton, Shlomo Weber:
Rawlsian pricing of access to public facilities: A unidimensional illustration. 759-766 - René van den Brink:
Null or nullifying players: The difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions. 767-775 - Kristian Behrens, Yasusada Murata:
General equilibrium models of monopolistic competition: A new approach. 776-787 - Guido Cozzi, Paolo Giordani, Luca Zamparelli:
The refoundation of the symmetric equilibrium in Schumpeterian growth models. 788-797
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