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ORCIDInternational Journal of Game Theory, Volume 49
Volume 49, Number 1, March 2020
- Jiabin Wu
:
Labelling, homophily and preference evolution. 1-22 - Michal Król, Magdalena Ewa Król:
On the strategic value of 'shooting yourself in the foot': an experimental study of burning money. 23-45 - Daniel Danau, Annalisa Vinella:
A note on optimal contracting with public ex post information under limited liability. 47-74 - Norma Olaizola, Federico Valenciano:
Dominance of weighted nested split graph networks in connections models. 75-96 - Takaaki Abe:
Population monotonic allocation schemes for games with externalities. 97-117 - Aleksei Yu. Kondratev, Vladimir V. Mazalov:
Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory. 119-145 - Oskar Skibski, Tomasz P. Michalak:
Fair division in the presence of externalities. 147-172 - Alfredo Valencia-Toledo, Juan J. Vidal-Puga:
Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems. 173-193 - Andrés Salamanca:
A generalization of the Harsanyi NTU value to games with incomplete information. 195-225 - Gérard Hamiache, Florian Navarro:
Associated consistency, value and graphs. 227-249 - Lawrence M. Ausubel, Oleg Baranov:
Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information. 251-273 - Bary S. R. Pradelski, Heinrich H. Nax:
Market sentiments and convergence dynamics in decentralized assignment economies. 275-298 - Ori Haimanko:
Generalized Coleman-Shapley indices and total-power monotonicity. 299-320 - Jasper de Jong, Marc Uetz:
The quality of equilibria for set packing and throughput scheduling games. 321-344
Volume 49, Number 2, June 2020
- Yangbo Song, Mihaela van der Schaar:
Dynamic network formation with foresighted agents. 345-384 - Takuya Iimura, Toshimasa Maruta, Takahiro Watanabe:
Two-person pairwise solvable games. 385-409 - Helmuts Azacis:
Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions. 411-444 - Kiho Yoon:
Bilateral trading with contingent contracts. 445-461 - Shunsuke Hanato:
Equilibrium payoffs and proposal ratios in bargaining models. 463-494 - Werner Güth, Manfred Stadler, Alexandra Zaby:
Capacity precommitment, communication, and collusive pricing: theoretical benchmark and experimental evidence. 495-524 - Yukihiko Funaki, Harold Houba, Evgenia Motchenkova:
Market power in bilateral oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures. 525-546 - Volker Britz, Hans Gersbach:
Information sharing in democratic mechanisms. 547-577 - Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo, Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo, Estela Sánchez-Rodríguez:
The boundary of the core of a balanced game: face games. 579-599 - Felipe Balmaceda:
Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all? 601-637 - Shiran Rachmilevitch:
Rewarding moderate behavior in a dynamic Nash Demand Game. 639-650 - Wei-Torng Juang, Guang-Zhen Sun, Kuo-Chih Yuan:
A model of parallel contests. 651-672
Volume 49, Number 3, September 2020
- Larry Samuelson, Jörgen W. Weibull:
Bill Sandholm in Memoriam. 673-680 - Takuya Iimura:
Unilaterally competitive games with more than two players. 681-697 - Eleonora Braggion, Nicola Gatti, Roberto Lucchetti, Tuomas Sandholm, Bernhard von Stengel:
Strong Nash equilibria and mixed strategies. 699-710 - Rubén Becerril-Borja, Andrés Perea:
Common belief in future and restricted past rationality. 711-747 - Aner Sela:
Optimal allocations of prizes and punishments in Tullock contests. 749-771 - Armando Gomes, Wilfredo Maldonado:
Mergers and acquisitions with conditional and unconditional offers. 773-800 - Z. Emel Öztürk:
Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency. 801-831 - Pablo Amorós:
Aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition. 833-849 - Manfred Besner:
Value dividends, the Harsanyi set and extensions, and the proportional Harsanyi solution. 851-873 - Martin Mihelich, Yan Shu:
Analytical solution of kth price auction. 875-884 - Liliana Garrido-da-Silva, Sofia B. S. D. Castro:
Cyclic dominance in a two-person rock-scissors-paper game. 885-912
Volume 49, Number 4, December 2020
- Sneha Bakshi:
Limits of price competition: cost asymmetry and imperfect information. 913-932 - Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato, Sayantan Ghosal, Ludovic A. Julien, Simone Tonin:
Existence and optimality of Cournot-Nash equilibria in a bilateral oligopoly with atoms and an atomless part. 933-951 - Parkash Chander:
Stability of the merger-to-monopoly and a core concept for partition function games. 953-973 - Hiromasa Takahashi, Toru Takemoto, Akihiro Suzuki:
Can players avoid the tragedy of the commons in a joint debt game? 975-1002 - Miguel A. Fonseca, Francesco Giovannoni, Miltiadis Makris:
Auctions with external incentives: experimental evidence. 1003-1043 - Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Min-Hung Tsay, Chun-Hsien Yeh:
A strategic justification of the Talmud rule based on lower and upper bounds. 1045-1057 - Bettina Klaus, Panos Protopapas:
On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals. 1059-1080 - Toshihiro Tsuchihashi:
Reserve price signaling in first-price auctions with an uncertain number of bidders. 1081-1103 - René Levínský, Abraham Neyman, Miroslav Zelený:
Should I remember more than you? Best responses to factored strategies. 1105-1124 - Yehuda John Levy:
On games without approximate equilibria. 1125-1128 - Ghislain-Herman Demeze-Jouatsa:
A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games. 1129-1142 - Achille Basile, Vincenzo Scalzo:
Non-emptiness of the alpha-core: sufficient and necessary conditions. 1143-1153
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