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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 92
Volume 92, July 2015
- Effrosyni Diamantoudi, Eiichi Miyagawa, Licun Xue:
Decentralized matching: The role of commitment. 1-17 - Thayer Morrill:
Making just school assignments. 18-27 - Jonas Hedlund:
Persuasion with communication costs. 28-40 - Christian Hilbe, Arne Traulsen, Karl Sigmund:
Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma. 41-52 - Simon P. Anderson, Alicia Baik, Nathan Larson:
Personalized pricing and advertising: An asymmetric equilibrium analysis. 53-73 - José A. García-Martínez, Fernando Vega-Redondo:
Social cohesion and the evolution of altruism. 74-105 - Jonathan H. W. Tan, Yves Breitmoser, Friedel Bolle:
Voluntary contributions by consent or dissent. 106-121 - James M. Malcomson:
Relational incentive contracts with productivity shocks. 122-137 - Nora Szech:
Tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions. 138-149 - Dominik Karos, Hans Peters:
Indirect control and power in mutual control structures. 150-165 - Jung S. You:
Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads. 166-190 - Shiran Rachmilevitch:
Bribing in second-price auctions. 191-205 - Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Marion Ott, Susanne Abele:
Auction fever: Rising revenue in second-price auction formats. 206-227
- Shuchi Chawla, Lisa Fleischer, Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden:
Introduction to the Special Issue - Algorithmic Game Theory - STOC/FOCS/SODA 2011. 228-231 - Umang Bhaskar, Lisa Fleischer, Elliot Anshelevich:
A Stackelberg strategy for routing flow over time. 232-247 - David Bindel, Jon M. Kleinberg, Sigal Oren:
How bad is forming your own opinion? 248-265 - Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis:
Extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing. 266-305 - Richard Cole, José R. Correa, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Neil Olver:
Decentralized utilitarian mechanisms for scheduling games. 306-326 - Constantinos Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum, Anthony Kim:
Near-optimal no-regret algorithms for zero-sum games. 327-348 - Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg:
Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders. 349-369 - Shaddin Dughmi, Jan Vondrák:
Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. 370-400 - Jason D. Hartline, Robert Kleinberg, Azarakhsh Malekian:
Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings. 401-429 - Christos H. Papadimitriou, George Pierrakos:
Optimal deterministic auctions with correlated priors. 430-454
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