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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 90
Volume 90, March 2015
- Juan Ortner:
Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals. 1-16 - Yan Chen, Ernst Fehr, Urs Fischbacher, Peter Morgan:
Decentralized matching and social segregation. 17-43 - Elena Panova:
A passion for voting. 44-65 - Vineet Abhishek, Bruce E. Hajek, Steven R. Williams:
On bidding with securities: Risk aversion and positive dependence. 66-80 - Sajid Anwar, Mingli Zheng:
Posted price selling and online auctions. 81-92 - Thomas W. L. Norman:
Learning, hypothesis testing, and rational-expectations equilibrium. 93-105 - Sang-Hyun Kim, Jay Pil Choi:
Optimal compatibility in systems markets. 106-118 - Anna Bogomolnaia, Hervé Moulin:
Size versus fairness in the assignment problem. 119-127
- Keiichi Kawai:
Sequential cheap talks. 128-133 - Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, María Gómez-Rúa, Elena Molis:
Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the Upstream Responsibility rule. 134-150 - P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski:
Bargaining with non-convexities. 151-161 - Christopher Phelan, Andrzej Skrzypacz:
Recall and private monitoring. 162-170 - Joseph Y. Halpern, Willemien Kets:
Ambiguous language and common priors. 171-180 - Odilon Câmara, Dan Bernhardt:
Learning about challengers. 181-206 - Saptarshi P. Ghosh, Jaideep Roy:
Committees with leaks. 207-214 - Anton Kolotilin:
Experimental design to persuade. 215-226 - Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, Aaron Roth:
Auctions with online supply. 227-246 - Lukasz Balbus, Anna Jaskiewicz, Andrzej S. Nowak:
Stochastic bequest games. 247-256 - Daniel Krähmer, Roland Strausz:
Ex post information rents in sequential screening. 257-273
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