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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 85
Volume 85, May 2014
- Jérôme Renault, Ludovic Renou, Tristan Tomala:
Secure message transmission on directed networks. 1-18 - Paul W. Goldberg, Arnoud Pastink:
On the communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria. 19-31 - Walter Trockel:
Robustness of intermediate agreements for the discrete Raiffa solution. 32-36 - Christian Ewerhart:
Cournot games with biconcave demand. 37-47 - Christian W. Bach, Elias Tsakas:
Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium. 48-59
- René Kirkegaard:
Ranking asymmetric auctions: Filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch. 60-69
- Johannes Hörner, Satoru Takahashi, Nicolas Vieille:
On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games. 70-83 - Maciej H. Kotowski, Fei Li:
On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints. 84-108 - Walter Bossert, Yves Sprumont:
Strategy-proof preference aggregation: Possibilities and characterizations. 109-126 - Daniel Gottlieb:
Imperfect memory and choice under risk. 127-158 - Wooyoung Lim:
Communication in bargaining over decision rights. 159-179
- Simon Grant, J. Jude Kline, John Quiggin:
A matter of interpretation: Ambiguous contracts and liquidated damages. 180-187
- Tobias Regner:
Social preferences? Google Answers! 188-209 - John H. Kagel, Yuanchuan Lien, Paul Milgrom:
Ascending prices and package bidding: Further experimental analysis. 210-231 - Sebastian Braun, Nadja Dwenger, Dorothea Kübler, Alexander Westkamp:
Implementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental analysis. 232-251 - Laurent Mathevet:
Beliefs and rationalizability in games with complementarities. 252-271 - Ola Andersson, Cédric Argenton, Jörgen W. Weibull:
Robustness to strategic uncertainty. 272-288 - Silvia Dominguez-Martinez, Randolph Sloof, Ferdinand A. von Siemens:
Monitored by your friends, not your foes: Strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority. 289-305
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