


default search action
Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 64
Volume 64, Number 1, September 2008
- Nabil I. Al-Najjar
:
Large games and the law of large numbers. 1-34 - Stefan Ambec, Lars Ehlers:
Sharing a river among satiable agents. 35-50 - Jean-Pierre Benoît, Efe A. Ok:
Nash implementation without no-veto power. 51-67 - Ioana Chioveanu
:
Advertising, brand loyalty and pricing. 68-80 - Dean Corbae, John Duffy
:
Experiments with network formation. 81-120 - Daniel Friedman, Daniel N. Ostrov:
Conspicuous consumption dynamics. 121-145 - Roberto Galbiati, Pietro Vertova:
Obligations and cooperative behaviour in public good games. 146-170 - Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, Timothy C. Salmon:
Revenue equivalence revisited. 171-192 - Hideo Konishi, Margarita Sapozhnikov:
Decentralized matching markets with endogenous salaries. 193-218 - Dorothea Kübler, Wieland Müller
, Hans-Theo Normann:
Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison. 219-236 - Raúl López-Pérez:
Aversion to norm-breaking: A model. 237-267 - Antonio Nicolò
, Yan Yu:
Strategic divide and choose. 268-289 - Marina Núñez
, Carles Rafels:
On the dimension of the core of the assignment game. 290-302 - Joana Pais
, Ágnes Pintér
:
School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms. 303-328
- Giacomo Calzolari, Alessandro Pavan:
On the use of menus in sequential common agency. 329-334 - Bertrand Tchantcho, Lawrence Diffo Lambo, Roland Pongou, Bertrand Mbama Engoulou:
Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories. 335-350
Volume 64, Number 2, November 2008
- Yael Maschler
:
In memory of my father. 352-354 - Robert J. Aumann:
Working with Mike. 355-360 - Salvador Barberà
:
Michael Maschler in Barcelona. 361-362 - Louis J. Billera:
The mentor. 363 - Daniel Granot:
My referee and collaborator. 364 - Ein-Ya Gura:
A mathematics teacher. 365-366 - Sergiu Hart
:
Michael's questions. 367 - Hervé Moulin:
An advocate of cooperative theory. 368 - Guillermo Owen:
Helping young game theorists. 369 - Bezalel Peleg:
My joint work with Michael Maschler. 370-371 - Jos A. M. Potters, Stef Tijs:
Michael Maschler in The Netherlands. 372 - Hana Shemesh:
Michael Maschler at the Center for the Study of Rationality. 373 - Martin Shubik:
In memory of Michael Maschler. 374 - Eilon Solan
:
Learning from Michael Maschler and working with him. 375 - Marilda Sotomayor:
Michael Maschler, a special friend. 376-377 - Oded Stark:
Michael Maschler: My lost migration compass. 378-379 - Federico Valenciano
:
Michael Maschler in Bilbao. 380 - Myrna Holtz Wooders:
In memory of Michael Maschler. 381 - H. Peyton Young:
Michael Maschler, game theory, and the Talmud. 382 - Shmuel Zamir:
Teacher, colleague and coauthor. 383-384 - Shmuel Zamir:
Biographical information: Michael B. Maschler. 385-387 - Steven Callander:
Majority rule when voters like to win. 393-420 - Marco E. Castillo
, Philip J. Cross:
Of mice and men: Within gender variation in strategic behavior. 421-432 - Michela Cella:
Informed principal with correlation. 433-456 - José R. Correa, Andreas S. Schulz
, Nicolás E. Stier Moses
:
A geometric approach to the price of anarchy in nonatomic congestion games. 457-469 - Enrico G. De Giorgi, Stefan Reimann:
The α-beauty contest: Choosing numbers, thinking intervals. 470-486 - Raymond Deneckere, Sergei Severinov:
Mechanism design with partial state verifiability. 487-513 - Alex Dickson, Roger Hartley:
The strategic Marshallian cross. 514-532 - Lars Ehlers, Ton Storcken:
Arrow's Possibility Theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences. 533-547 - Kjell Hausken:
Whether to attack a terrorist's resource stock today or tomorrow. 548-564 - Ratul Lahkar
, William H. Sandholm:
The projection dynamic and the geometry of population games. 565-590 - Jordi Massó
, Antonio Nicolò
:
Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences. 591-611 - Ahuva Mu'alem, Noam Nisan:
Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions. 612-631 - Joana Pais
:
Incentives in decentralized random matching markets. 632-649 - Maxwell Pak:
Stochastic stability and time-dependent mutations. 650-665 - William H. Sandholm, Emin Dokumaci, Ratul Lahkar
:
The projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic. 666-683

manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.