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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 62
Volume 62, Number 1, January 2008
- Estelle Cantillon:
The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions. 1-25 - Herbert Dawid, W. Bentley MacLeod:
Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms. 26-52 - Martin Meier:
Universal knowledge-belief structures. 53-66 - David P. Myatt, Chris C. Wallace:
An evolutionary analysis of the volunteer's dilemma. 67-76 - P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Gerard van der Laan, Dolf Talman:
The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games. 77-92 - Brit Grosskopf, Rosemarie Nagel:
The two-person beauty contest. 93-99 - Julio González-Díaz, Estela Sánchez-Rodríguez:
Cores of convex and strictly convex games. 100-105 - Emre Ozdenoren, James Peck:
Ambiguity aversion, games against nature, and dynamic consistency. 106-115 - Bas van Velzen, Herbert Hamers, Tamás Solymosi:
Core stability in chain-component additive games. 116-139 - Helmuts Azacis:
Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint. 140-154 - Theodore L. Turocy:
Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty. 155-179 - Miltiadis Makris:
Complementarities and macroeconomics: Poisson games. 180-189 - Thomas Wiseman:
Reputation and impermanent types. 190-210 - Lucy White:
Prudence in bargaining: The effect of uncertainty on bargaining outcomes. 211-231 - Joseph Y. Halpern, Leandro Chaves Rêgo:
Interactive unawareness revisited. 232-262 - Uri Simonsohn, Niklas Karlsson, George Loewenstein, Dan Ariely:
The tree of experience in the forest of information: Overweighing experienced relative to observed information. 263-286 - Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr, Urs Fischbacher:
Testing theories of fairness - Intentions matter. 287-303 - Aviad Heifetz, Martin Meier, Burkhard C. Schipper:
A canonical model for interactive unawareness. 304-324
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Simon Weidenholzer:
Erratum to "Partial bandwagon effects and local interactions" [Games Econ. Behav. 61(2007) 179-197]. 325
- Ehud Kalai:
Expanded number of Editors at Games and Economic Behavior. 326
Volume 62, Number 2, March 2008
- Manel Baucells, Lloyd S. Shapley:
Multiperson utility. 329-347 - Christopher P. Chambers:
Consistent representative democracy. 348-363 - Giovanna Devetag, Massimo Warglien:
Playing the wrong game: An experimental analysis of relational complexity and strategic misrepresentation. 364-382 - Kfir Eliaz, Theo Offerman, Andrew Schotter:
Creating competition out of thin air: An experimental study of right-to-choose auctions. 383-416 - Anita Gantner:
Bargaining, search, and outside options. 417-435 - Dino Gerardi, Leeat Yariv:
Information acquisition in committees. 436-459 - Dinko Dimitrov, Claus-Jochen Haake:
Stable governments and the semistrict core. 460-475 - Ronald M. Harstad, Aleksandar Sasa Pekec, Ilia Tsetlin:
Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders. 476-508 - Daniel Houser, Erte Xiao, Kevin McCabe, Vernon L. Smith:
When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation. 509-532 - Philippe Jehiel, Frédéric Koessler:
Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations. 533-557 - Justin Leroux:
Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: Characterization in the two-agent case. 558-572 - Dunia López-Pintado:
Diffusion in complex social networks. 573-590 - Claudio Mezzetti, Aleksandar Sasa Pekec, Ilia Tsetlin:
Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions. 591-609 - Thomas W. L. Norman:
Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces. 610-627 - Barry O'Neill, Bezalel Peleg:
Lexicographic composition of simple games. 628-642 - Zvi Lotker, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Mark R. Tuttle:
A game of timing and visibility. 643-660 - Abhijit Sengupta, Kunal Sengupta:
A Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with the option to quit. 661-674 - Fei Song:
Trust and reciprocity behavior and behavioral forecasts: Individuals versus group-representatives. 675-696 - John H. Kagel, Svetlana Pevnitskaya, Lixin Ye:
Indicative bidding: An experimental analysis. 697-721
- Lucie Ménager:
Consensus and common knowledge of an aggregate of decisions. 722-731 - Marcin Peski:
Comparison of information structures in zero-sum games. 732-735
- Bernard Monjardet:
Statement of precedence and a comment on IIA terminology. 736-738
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