default search action
Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 43
Volume 43, Number 1, April 2003
- Lars Ehlers:
Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules. 1-27 - Ezra Einy, Benyamin Shitovitz:
Symmetric von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in pure exchange economies. 28-43 - Sjur Didrik Flåm, Abderrahim Jourani:
Strategic behavior and partial cost sharing. 44-56 - Sanjeev Goyal, Sumit Joshi:
Networks of collaboration in oligopoly. 57-85 - Stefan Napel:
Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame. 86-106 - Thomas C. O'Connell, Richard Edwin Stearns:
On finite strategy sets for finitely repeated zero-sum games. 107-136 - Jörg Oechssler, Burkhard C. Schipper:
Can you guess the game you are playing? 137-152 - Stephanie Rosenkranz, Patrick W. Schmitz:
Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances. 153-173
Volume 43, Number 2, May 2003
- Eddie Dekel, Asher Wolinsky:
Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions. 175-188 - Jacques Durieu, Philippe Solal:
Adaptive play with spatial sampling. 189-195 - Chen-Ying Huang, Tomas Sjöström:
Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities. 196-213 - Zvika Neeman:
The effectiveness of English auctions. 214-238 - Amnon Rapoport, William E. Stein, James E. Parco, Thomas E. Nicholas:
Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game. 239-265 - Paat Rusmevichientong, Benjamin Van Roy:
Decentralized decision-making in a large team with local information. 266-295 - Andreas Westermark:
Bargaining, binding contracts, and competitive wages. 296-311 - Parimal Kanti Bag:
Unraveling in first-price auction. 312-321 - Victor Ginsburgh, Israel Zang:
The museum pass game and its value. 322-325
manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.