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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 39
Volume 39, Number 1, April 2002
- John Duffy, Nick Feltovich:
Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? An Experimental Comparison of Observation and Cheap Talk. 1-27 - Tore Ellingsen, Jack Robles:
Does Evolution Solve the Hold-Up Problem? 28-53 - Joseph Greenberg, Xiao Luo, Reza Oladi, Benyamin Shitovitz:
(Sophisticated) Stable Sets in Exchange Economies. 54-70 - Wei-Torng Juang:
Rule Evolution and Equilibrium Selection. 71-90 - Özgür Kibris:
Misrepresentation of Utilities in Bargaining: Pure Exchange and Public Good Economies. 91-110 - Amnon Rapoport, Darryl A. Seale, Eyal Winter:
Coordination and Learning Behavior in Large Groups with Asymmetric Players. 111-136 - Daniel Sgroi:
Optimizing Information in the Herd: Guinea Pigs, Profits, and Welfare. 137-166 - Matthew J. Ryan:
Violations of Belief Persistence in Dempster-Shafer Equilibrium. 167-174
Volume 39, Number 2, May 2002
- Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Claudia Keser:
Conventions and Local Interaction Structures: Experimental Evidence. 177-205 - Christian Ewerhart:
Backward Induction and the Game-Theoretic Analysis of Chess. 206-214 - Hanming Fang, Sérgio O. Parreiras:
Equilibrium of Affiliated Value Second Price Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders: The Two-Bidder Case. 215-236 - Chantale LaCasse, Clara Ponsati, Vicky Barham:
Chores. 237-281 - Hans-Theo Normann:
Endogenous Timing with Incomplete Information and with Observable Delay. 282-291 - Roberto Serrano, Rajiv Vohra:
Bargaining and Bargaining Sets. 292-308 - Oscar Volij:
In Defense of DEFECT. 309-321
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