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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 34
Volume 34, Number 1, January 2001
- Walter Bossert, Hans Peters:
Minimax Regret and Efficient Bargaining under Uncertainty. 1-10 - James C. Cox, Jason M. Shachat, Mark Walker:
An Experiment to Evaluate Bayesian Learning of Nash Equilibrium Play. 11-33 - Hans Jørgen Jacobsen, Mogens Jensen, Birgitte Sloth:
Evolutionary Learning in Signalling Games. 34-63 - Bettina Klaus:
Coalitional Strategy-Proofness in Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object. 64-82 - Jinpeng Ma:
Job Matching and Coalition Formation with Utility or Disutility of Co-workers. 83-103 - Rajiv Sarin, Farshid Vahid:
Predicting How People Play Games: A Simple Dynamic Model of Choice. 104-122 - Ulrich Schwalbe, Paul Walker:
Zermelo and the Early History of Game Theory. 123-137 - Reinhard Selten, Myrna Holtz Wooders:
Cyclic Games: An Introduction and Some Examples. 138-152 - Marco Slikker, Anne van den Nouweland:
A One-Stage Model of Link Formation and Payoff Division. 153-175
Volume 34, Number 2, February 2001
- Simon P. Anderson, Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt:
Minimum-Effort Coordination Games: Stochastic Potential and Logit Equilibrium. 177-199 - Ken Binmore, Larry Samuelson:
Evolution and Mixed Strategies. 200-226 - Amit K. Biswas, T. Parthasarathy, G. Ravindran:
Stability and Largeness of the Core. 227-237 - Miguel Costa-Gomes, Klaus G. Zauner:
Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior in Israel, Japan, Slovenia, and the United States: A Social Utility Analysis. 238-269 - Francesco De Sinopoli:
On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcomes in Plurality Games. 270-286 - Ezra Einy, Benyamin Shitovitz:
Private Value Allocations in Large Economies with Differential Information. 287-311 - Jack Robles:
Evolution in Finitely Repeated Coordination Games. 312-330 - Alison Watts:
A Dynamic Model of Network Formation. 331-341 - John Wooders, Jason M. Shachat:
On the Irrelevance of Risk Attitudes in Repeated Two-Outcome Games. 342-363
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