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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 31
Volume 31, Number 1, April 2000
- Rabah Amir, John Wooders:
One-Way Spillovers, Endogenous Innovator/Imitator Roles, and Research Joint Ventures. 1-25 - Bruce C. Hartman, Moshe Dror, Moshe Shaked:
Cores of Inventory Centralization Games. 26-49 - Yuri M. Kaniovski, Arkadii V. Kryazhimskii, H. Peyton Young:
Adaptive Dynamics in Games Played by Heterogeneous Populations. 50-96 - Marco Mariotti:
Maximum Games, Dominance Solvability, and Coordination. 97-105 - David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein:
Implementation of Bargaining Sets via Simple Mechanisms. 106-120 - Takashi Ui:
A Shapley Value Representation of Potential Games. 121-135 - Giulio Codognato:
Cournot-Nash Equilibria in Limit Exchange Economies with Complete Markets: A Comparison between Two Models. 136-146 - Jinpeng Ma:
An Alternative Proof of an Equilibrium Existence Theorem in Exchange Economies with Indivisibilities. 147-151 - Aner Sela:
Fictitious Play in 2 × 3 Games. 152-162
Volume 31, Number 2, May 2000
- Rod Garratt, Cheng-Zhong Qin:
On Market Games When Agents Cannot Be in Two Places at Once. 165-173 - Steffen Huck, Wieland Müller:
Perfect versus Imperfect Observability - An Experimental Test of Bagwell's Result. 174-190 - Massimo Marinacci:
Ambiguous Games. 191-219 - Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
k-Price Auctions. 220-244 - Eilon Solan:
Absorbing Team Games. 245-261 - Catherine J. Weinberger:
Selective Acceptance and Inefficiency in a Two-Issue Complete Information Bargaining Game. 262-293 - José Alcalde, Antonio Romero-Medina:
Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems. 294-302 - Levent Koçkesen, Efe A. Ok, Rajiv Sethi:
Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in Aggregative Games. 303-310 - Stephen Morris, Costis Skiadas:
Rationalizable Trade. 311-323 - Leslie M. Marx, Jeroen M. Swinkels:
Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance. 324-329
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