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ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 130
Volume 130, November 2021
- Philippe Jehiel, Juni Singh:
Multi-state choices with aggregate feedback on unfamiliar alternatives. 1-24 - Nejat Anbarci, Ching-Jen Sun, M. Utku Ünver
:
Designing practical and fair sequential team contests: The case of penalty shootouts. 25-43 - Elias Tsakas, Nikolas Tsakas:
Noisy persuasion. 44-61 - Dirk Bergemann, Edmund Yeh, Jinkun Zhang:
Nonlinear pricing with finite information. 62-84 - Benny Moldovanu, Frank Rosar:
Brexit: A comparison of dynamic voting games with irreversible options. 85-108 - Aurélie Dariel, Arno Riedl, Simon Siegenthaler:
Referral hiring and wage formation in a market with adverse selection. 109-130 - Daniela Glätzle-Rützler, Philipp Lergetporer, Matthias Sutter:
Collective intertemporal decisions and heterogeneity in groups. 131-147 - Michelle R. Garfinkel, Constantinos Syropoulos:
Self-enforcing peace agreements that preserve the status quo. 148-178 - Steffen Lippert, James Tremewan:
Pledge-and-review in the laboratory. 179-195 - Victor Klockmann, Alicia von Schenk, Ferdinand A. von Siemens:
Division of labor and the organization of knowledge in production: A laboratory experiment. 196-210 - Keisuke Bando, Ryo Kawasaki:
Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem. 211-223 - Jorge Vásquez, Marek Weretka:
Co-worker altruism and unemployment. 224-239 - Peter Schram:
Self-managing terror: Resolving agency problems with diverse teams. 240-257 - Melis Kartal, Wieland Müller, James Tremewan:
Building trust: The costs and benefits of gradualism. 258-275 - Sidartha Gordon, Chantal Marlats, Lucie Ménager:
Observation delays in teams and effort cycles. 276-298 - Ujjwal Kumar, Souvik Roy, Arunava Sen, Sonal Yadav, Huaxia Zeng:
Local global equivalence for unanimous social choice functions. 299-308 - Clemens Puppe, Jana Rollmann:
Mean versus median voting in multi-dimensional budget allocation problems. A laboratory experiment. 309-330 - Roland Pongou, Bertrand Tchantcho:
Round-robin political tournaments: Abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power. 331-351 - Pedro Dal Bó, Guillaume Fréchette, Jeongbin Kim:
The determinants of efficient behavior in coordination games. 352-368 - Liad Blumrosen, Shahar Dobzinski:
(Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. 369-383 - Behrang Kamali Shahdadi:
The effects of student composition on teachers' effort and students' performance: Implications for tracking, school choice, and affirmative action. 384-399 - Mike Felgenhauer:
Experimentation and manipulation with preregistration. 400-408 - Dominik Karos, Laura Robles:
Full farsighted rationality. 409-424 - Xiaogang Che, Yangguang Huang, Le Zhang:
Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy. 425-442 - Paul H. Edelman, Attila Pór:
A new axiomatic approach to the impartial nomination problem. 443-451 - Tobias Gesche:
De-biasing strategic communication. 452-464
- Ryuji Sano:
Dynamic slot allocations with different patience levels. 465-473
- Daisuke Hirata, Yusuke Kasuya, Kentaro Tomoeda:
Stability against robust deviations in the roommate problem. 474-498 - Sebastian Dengler, Jens Prüfer:
Consumers' privacy choices in the era of big data. 499-520 - Jeffrey Mensch:
Monotone persuasion. 521-542 - David Pérez-Castrillo, Chaoran Sun:
Value-free reductions. 543-568 - Alan H. Beggs:
Games with second-order expected utility. 569-590
- Simon Koch, Philipp Weinschenk:
Contract design with socially attentive preferences. 591-601
- Angélica Córdova, Alex Imas, Daniel Schwartz:
Are non-contingent incentives more effective in motivating new behavior? Evidence from the field. 602-615 - Oliver Kirchkamp, Wladislaw Mill:
Spite vs. risk: Explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction: A theoretical and experimental investigation. 616-635 - Rafael M. Frongillo, Ian A. Kash:
General truthfulness characterizations via convex analysis. 636-662 - Francis Bloch, Anne van den Nouweland:
Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games. 663-683
- Agustín G. Bonifacio, Jordi Massó:
Corrigendum to "On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness" [Games Econ. Behav. 124 (2020) 219-238]. 684-689
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