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ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 124
Volume 124, November 2020
- Leyla D. Karakas, Devashish Mitra
:
Inequality, redistribution and the rise of outsider candidates. 1-16 - Cangjian Cao, Sherry Xin Li, Tracy Xiao Liu:
A gift with thoughtfulness: A field experiment on work incentives. 17-42 - Godfrey Keller, Sven Rady:
Undiscounted bandit games. 43-61 - Jan Christoph Schlegel, Akaki Mamageishvili:
Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities. 62-81 - Bernardo García-Pola:
Do people minimize regret in strategic situations? A level-k comparison. 82-104 - Jeanne Hagenbach, Frédéric Koessler:
Cheap talk with coarse understanding. 105-121 - Jérôme Renault, Bruno Ziliotto:
Hidden stochastic games and limit equilibrium payoffs. 122-139 - Yehuda John Levy, Andre Veiga:
On the existence of positive equilibrium profits in competitive screening markets. 140-168 - John Kennes, Daniel le Maire, Sebastian T. Roelsgaard:
Equivalence of canonical matching models. 169-182 - Artyom Shneyerov, Adam Chi Leung Wong:
Price discovery in a matching and bargaining market with aggregate uncertainty. 183-206 - John Hillas, Dmitriy Kvasov:
Backward induction in games without perfect recall. 207-218 - Agustín G. Bonifacio, Jordi Massó:
On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness. 219-238 - Lucas C. Coffman, Paul Niehaus:
Pathways of persuasion. 239-253 - Luke Boosey, Sebastian J. Goerg:
The timing of discretionary bonuses - effort, signals, and reciprocity. 254-280 - Rachel Shafer:
Minimax regret and failure to converge to efficiency in large markets. 281-287 - Giovanna d'Adda, Martin Dufwenberg, Francesco Passarelli, Guido Tabellini:
Social norms with private values: Theory and experiments. 288-304
- Gaoji Hu, Jiangtao Li, Rui Tang:
The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences. 305-318
- Romain Ferrali:
Partners in crime? Corruption as a criminal network. 319-353 - Michael Mitzkewitz, Tibor Neugebauer:
Can intermediaries assure contracts? Experimental evidence. 354-368 - Keith M. Marzilli Ericson:
When consumers do not make an active decision: Dynamic default rules and their equilibrium effects. 369-385 - Juan Carlos Carbajal, Ahuva Mu'alem:
Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer. 386-405 - Javier D. Donna, Pablo Schenone, Gregory F. Veramendi:
Networks, frictions, and price dispersion. 406-431 - Brian Swenson, Ryan W. Murray, Soummya Kar:
Regular potential games. 432-453 - Ittai Abraham, Susan Athey, Moshe Babaioff, Michael Grubb:
Peaches, lemons, and cookies: Designing auction markets with dispersed information. 454-477 - Haris Aziz, Hau Chan, Barton E. Lee, David C. Parkes:
The capacity constrained facility location problem. 478-490 - Benjamin Sperisen, Thomas Wiseman:
Too good to fire: Non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game. 491-511 - Andrew Mackenzie:
A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation. 512-533 - Michal Szkup, Isabel Trevino:
Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games. 534-553 - Giuseppe Ciccarone, Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, Stefano Papa:
The rationale of in-group favoritism: An experimental test of three explanations. 554-568 - Suparee Boonmanunt, Agne Kajackaite, Stephan Meier:
Does poverty negate the impact of social norms on cheating? 569-578
- Qingyun Wu:
Entering classes in the college admissions model. 579-587
- David Danz:
Never underestimate your opponent: Hindsight bias causes overplacement and overentry into competition. 588-603 - Aidas Masiliunas, Heinrich H. Nax:
Framing and repeated competition. 604-619 - Evan Friedman:
Endogenous quantal response equilibrium. 620-643
- Mukund Sundararajan, Qiqi Yan:
Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers. 644-658 - Yin Chen, Chuangyin Dang:
An extension of quantal response equilibrium and determination of perfect equilibrium. 659-670
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