default search action
Google
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Internet Archive Scholar
CiteSeerX
ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 102
Volume 102, March 2017
- Robert Akerlof:
Value Formation: The Role of Esteem. 1-19 - Yeon-Koo Che, Syngjoo Choi
, Jinwoo Kim:
An experimental study of sponsored-search auctions. 20-43 - Zhenhua Jiao, Guoqiang Tian:
The Blocking Lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings. 44-55 - Sangram Vilasrao Kadam:
Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts. 56-68 - Gustavo Bergantiños, Julio González-Díaz, Ángel Manuel González-Rueda, María P. Fernández de Córdoba:
Loss allocation in energy transmission networks. 69-97 - Jens Leth Hougaard, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Mich Tvede, Lars Peter Østerdal:
Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture. 98-110 - John Duggan:
Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria. 111-126 - Malte Dold, Menusch Khadjavi:
Jumping the queue: An experiment on procedural preferences. 127-137
- Mert Kimya:
Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules. 138-146 - Simon Siegenthaler:
Meet the lemons: An experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets. 147-161 - Euncheol Shin:
Monopoly pricing and diffusion of social network goods. 162-178 - Laurent Bouton, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Frédéric Malherbe:
Unanimous rules in the laboratory. 179-198 - Joseph McMurray:
Voting as communicating: Mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse. 199-223 - Andrew T. Little:
Propaganda and credulity. 224-232 - Charles Bellemare, Alexander Sebald, Sigrid Suetens:
A note on testing guilt aversion. 233-239 - Eric Schmidbauer:
Multi-period competitive cheap talk with highly biased experts. 240-254 - Fuhai Hong, Wooyoung Lim, Xiaojian Zhao:
The emergence of compositional grammars in artificial codes. 255-268 - Martin Dufwenberg, Maros Servátka, Radovan Vadovic:
Honesty and informal agreements. 269-285 - Volodymyr Lugovskyy, Daniela Puzzello, Andrea Sorensen, James M. Walker, Arlington Williams:
An experimental study of finitely and infinitely repeated linear public goods games. 286-302 - Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt, Angela M. Smith:
An experimental examination of the volunteer's dilemma. 303-315 - Sourav Bhattacharya, John Duffy, Sun-Tak Kim:
Voting with endogenous information acquisition: Experimental evidence. 316-338 - Michael P. Wellman, Eric Sodomka, Amy Greenwald:
Self-confirming price-prediction strategies for simultaneous one-shot auctions. 339-372 - René Kirkegaard:
Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach. 373-387 - Volker Hahn:
Committee design with endogenous participation. 388-408 - Ronald Stauber:
Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games. 409-432 - Agne Kajackaite, Uri Gneezy:
Incentives and cheating. 433-444 - Uri Gneezy, Christina Gravert, Silvia Saccardo, Franziska Tausch:
A must lie situation - avoiding giving negative feedback. 445-454 - Itai Arieli, Manuel Mueller-Frank:
Inferring beliefs from actions. 455-461 - Youngsub Chun, Duygu Yengin:
Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem. 462-476 - Joel Sobel:
A note on pre-play communication. 477-486 - Alistair J. Wilson, Hong Wu:
At-will relationships: How an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency. 487-507 - Antonio Nicolò, Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez:
Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange. 508-524 - Greg Leo:
Taking turns. 525-547 - Nicholas C. Bedard:
The strategically ignorant principal. 548-561 - Allen I. K. Vong:
Strategic manipulation in tournament games. 562-567 - Tao Wang:
Information revelation through bunching. 568-582 - David R. M. Thompson, Kevin Leyton-Brown:
Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions. 583-623 - Luca Anderlini, Daniele Terlizzese:
Equilibrium trust. 624-644 - Jin Yeub Kim:
Interim third-party selection in bargaining. 645-665 - János Flesch, Dries Vermeulen, Anna Zseleva:
Zero-sum games with charges. 666-686 - Wolfgang J. Luhan, Anders U. Poulsen, Michael W. M. Roos:
Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: Experimental evidence. 687-699
manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.
last updated on 2025-04-14 00:39 CEST by the dblp team
all metadata released as open data under CC0 1.0 license
see also: Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Imprint
dblp was originally created in 1993 at:
since 2018, dblp has been operated and maintained by:
the dblp computer science bibliography is funded and supported by:
