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ORCID5th SAGT 2012: Barcelona, Spain
- Maria J. Serna:
Algorithmic Game Theory - 5th International Symposium, SAGT 2012, Barcelona, Spain, October 22-23, 2012. Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 7615, Springer 2012, ISBN 978-3-642-33995-0 - Krzysztof R. Apt, Sunil Simon:
A Classification of Weakly Acyclic Games. 1-12 - Krzysztof R. Apt, Guido Schäfer:
Selfishness Level of Strategic Games. 13-24 - Vincenzo Auletta
, George Christodoulou, Paolo Penna:
Mechanisms for Scheduling with Single-Bit Private Values. 25-36 - Vittorio Bilò, Marios Mavronicolas:
The Complexity of Decision Problems about Nash Equilibria in Win-Lose Games. 37-48 - Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal:
An Optimal Bound to Access the Core in TU-Games. 49-60 - K. Ruben Brokkelkamp, Mees J. de Vries:
Convergence of Ordered Improvement Paths in Generalized Congestion Games. 61-71 - Andreas Cord-Landwehr, Martina Hüllmann, Peter Kling, Alexander Setzer:
Basic Network Creation Games with Communication Interests. 72-83 - Nuh Aygün Dalkiran, Moshe Hoffman, Ramamohan Paturi, Daniel Ricketts, Andrea Vattani:
Common Knowledge and State-Dependent Equilibria. 84-95 - Kord Eickmeyer, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Elad Verbin:
Approximating the Minmax Value of Three-Player Games within a Constant is as Hard as Detecting Planted Cliques. 96-107 - John Fearnley, Paul W. Goldberg, Rahul Savani, Troels Bjerre Sørensen:
Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria Below Two-Thirds. 108-119 - Michal Feldman, John K. Lai:
Mechanisms and Impossibilities for Truthful, Envy-Free Allocations. 120-131 - Michal Feldman, Tom Ron:
Capacitated Network Design Games. 132-143 - Diodato Ferraioli, Paul W. Goldberg, Carmine Ventre:
Decentralized Dynamics for Finite Opinion Games. 144-155 - Dimitris Fotakis, Alexis C. Kaporis, Thanasis Lianeas, Paul G. Spirakis:
On the Hardness of Network Design for Bottleneck Routing Games. 156-167 - Hu Fu, Patrick R. Jordan, Mohammad Mahdian, Uri Nadav, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Sergei Vassilvitskii:
Ad Auctions with Data. 168-179 - Paul W. Goldberg, Antony McCabe:
Commodity Auctions and Frugality Ratios. 180-191 - Paul W. Goldberg, Arnoud Pastink:
On the Communication Complexity of Approximate Nash Equilibria. 192-203 - Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot, Stefano Moretti, Kim Thang Nguyen:
Congestion Games with Capacitated Resources. 204-215 - Jochen Könemann, Kate Larson, David Steiner:
Network Bargaining: Using Approximate Blocking Sets to Stabilize Unstable Instances. 216-226 - Evangelos Markakis, Orestis Telelis:
Uniform Price Auctions: Equilibria and Efficiency. 227-238 - Marios Mavronicolas, Burkhard Monien:
Minimizing Expectation Plus Variance. 239-250 - Vahab S. Mirrokni, Nithum Thain, Adrian Vetta:
A Theoretical Examination of Practical Game Playing: Lookahead Search. 251-262
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